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Was it a surprise?  
Was it a surprise that people poured into the streets demanding an end to 
Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Salih’s rule? No. It was not. The time was ripe 
for such an eruption.  
When the youth demonstrations started in February 2011, after more than 
32 years of Salih’s rule, Yemen was the embodiment of a failed state, ranking 
13th among countries deemed most at risk of failure in the Fund for Peace’s 
2011 Failed State Index. In a country where two-thirds of the population is 
under the age of 24, the unemployment rate was conservatively estimated at 35 
percent; other estimates put the rate at 49 percent. Nearly half the population 
was living under the poverty line, on less than $2 per day. Corruption was 
epidemically rampant. The country ranked 146th out of 179 countries on 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2010). Water is 
scarce and the country’s oil resources, which account for two-thirds of public 
revenue and 90 percent of export receipts, have dwindled.  
Certainly, under these circumstances, protest demonstrations and demands 
for change were only to be expected. The time, I repeat, was ripe for such an 
eruption. Not to expect this would have been bizarre.  
What surprised me, however, was the involvement of the youth – their 
pivotal role in shaping the dramatic events that took place in Yemen, as well as 
their determination to stay peaceful. That was a bit of fresh air.  
Few, if any, expected the chain of events that started when Tunisian 
Mohammad Bouazizi set himself on fire on December 17, 2010 – a flame that 
spread from one authoritarian Arab state to another. These countries were 
also ripe for a change. And like their Arab counterparts, Yemeni youth were 
fed up with their corrupt political elites; they wanted change, a future, and 
 wanted it now, in their own country. Just a day after President Ben Ali fled 
Tunisia, young, middle-class, educated Yemenis decided to organize a 
demonstration in front of the French embassy to protest the shameful official 
French position toward the Tunisian uprising. A day later, a huge 
demonstration started at Sana’a University. The uprising was thus launched, 
and spread to other cities in Yemen. 
At this moment, there was again hope in Yemen – something I have long 
missed in my country. I belong to a middle-aged Yemeni generation that lost 
hope, a fact that prompted me and many other educated Yemenis to leave the 
country and build a future elsewhere. And now here I am, meeting a different 
sort of Yemeni youth – educated, determined to make a difference, but in 
their own country. In fact, when I attended a women’s rally at Taghir Square at 
Sana’a University on February 28, 2011, nothing but hope could be sensed.  
Unity was the motto at the time. But at that point, unity was achievable only 
because the rallying cry of toppling the president proved to be so powerful. It 
managed to unify different groups that in other circumstances stand at odds 
with one another. In this case, each joined the movement, but for different 
reasons.  
Even during these days, before the March 19 massacre of protestors in 
Taghir Square, I was pestered by doubts. As a human and a Yemeni I could 
not help but hope; and hope, believe me, is a magical force. But as a social 
scientist, I learned long ago that one cannot cook without the necessary 
ingredients. In the Yemeni case, the necessary ingredients for a stable nation-
state are absent. In fact, the problem with Yemen has to do with the project of 
the state itself.  
In the end, the reality of Yemeni political and social structures rose to take 
over once again, and the expectation that things could indeed change for the 
better faded away. This is in short where we stand today. 
If we try to untangle Yemen’s web of political problems, it becomes clear 
that the country is facing serious concurrent issues:  
First: There is a power struggle among the core ethnic elites who have run 
the country for decades, enabling the president to survive and remain in 
power. Their bickering threatens the stability of the whole system. Over time, 
the state came to represent the interests of a dominant ethnic group (northern 
Zaydi Qahtani of the Hashid tribal confederation), becoming a vehicle for 
safeguarding their ethnic interests. Other social groups were pushed to accept 
the institutional reality of a state that has rarely considered them to be equal 
citizens. The lack of solid institutional foundations made it possible for the 
“ethnicized” elites to hijack the state’s institutions for their benefit. These core 
leaders control among themselves the army and security services. However, 
their solid alliance began to wither at the beginning of 2000, when Salih started 
to groom his son Ahmed as his successor. The youth protests provided a 
golden opportunity to one faction of these core strongmen, the Al-Ahmar 
brothers (the sheiks of the paramount Hashid tribal confederation) and Ali 
Mohsen Al-Ahmar (Salih’s half brother and top military commander). They 
readily joined the youth protestors, and military confrontations followed. 
Ironically, the youth protestors were calling for an end to the Salih regime, but 
found themselves stuck with a situation in which those who decided to join 
and protect them were very much part of that regime. This is one reason why 
the youth project of change ultimately floundered.  
Second: Yemen is not one Yemen. It is many Yemens. And the issue here 
transcends the north-south division. The issue here has to do with the 
statehood projects in both North and South Yemen. The scope of this article 
does not allow this issue to be discussed in depth here. Suffice it to say that 
Yemen is two units, each of which is divided in turn along ethnic lines, a 
situation that led to recurrent violent coups and wars in each region both 
before and after their unification in 1990. More specifically:  
North Yemen has been split along tribal and sectarian lines, among other 
divisions. The most relevant division today is that between Hashimite Zaydis, 
Qahtani Zaydis, Sunni Shafites and Sunni Salafites. 
This division has since 2004 partly expressed itself in the tribal and sectarian 
war of Sada’a, led by the al-Huthi family, and in the current fighting between 
Salafi groups and the Huthis in the northern provinces. The Huthi movement 
has turned the northern Sada’a into a state within a state. Its troops have been 
fighting their way to neighboring governances since the end of 2011 (Haja, 
Amran and Al-Jawf). Some news reports indicate that this fighting is taking 
 place with the blessing of the Yemeni president. It would not be a surprise if 
this turns out to be true. 
Sectarian division has also been obvious in the alienation of the Sunni 
Shafites in the area’s middle regions, specifically in Taiz, Ibb and Al Baida. It 
was no coincidence that many of the youthful students who started the 
protests came from these middle regions! 
South Yemen, on the other hand, has been divided along tribal, regional and 
cultural lines. The most prominent division has been that between the Ad Dali 
and Radfan regions on the one hand, and the Abien and Shabwa regions on 
the other. The region of Hadramout, moreover, has always considered itself a 
separate unit that deserves statehood. The Southern Movement is divided 
between those who demand separation and those who demand a federal 
system. Interestingly, this divergence also falls along regional lines! 
Both the Southern Movement, with its fractured leaderships, and the Zaydi 
Huthi movement supported the youth uprising when it started in February. 
However, the support of Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and the al-Ahmar clan has 
increased the influence of Salafi and Muslim Brotherhood Islamists in the sit-
in camps, leading to an end to this cooperation.  
Third: Yemen has always been a weak state. Today the state is not only weak; 
it is on the verge of collapse. North Yemen has struggled to control its 
territory since its inception in 1962. And South Yemeni political elites used 
brutal coercive measures under the socialist system (1967 – 1990) to keep the 
state under control. But the moment the party collapsed, the state apparatus 
toppled with it. Since the 1994 civil war, the weakness of the Yemeni state has 
been its most characteristic feature. The power struggle between core elites, 
the south’s persistent challenges to northern authority in their regions, and the 
on-and-off Huthi rebellion have destabilized the whole system, creating a 
power vacuum. This vacuum has been filled in some parts of the south by 
Islamist terrorists.  
Given the magnitude of Yemen’s problems, I have expressed doubt that the 
Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative, issued on May 21/22, 2011, which led 
to a presidential inauguration of the former Vice President Hadi, would 
provide Yemen with a safe exit from its explosive situation.1 In fact, I have 
considered it a patchwork solution unable to defuse the crisis either in the 
short or long run. This document treats the Yemeni crisis as a simple conflict 
between two fighting parties and ignores the Huthi and Southern movements. 
Most importantly, it seeks to preserve the status quo within the Yemeni 
political system. This has to do with the leading role played by Saudi Arabia in 
charting the initiative. The kingdom has an interest in preserving the old 
Yemeni system, whose leaders have been its trusted allies despite the tensions 
between the two. The Saudi government also has an interest in hindering real 
political reforms in Yemen, lest this encourage Saudi citizens to demand 
similar actions.  
Yet keeping the status quo is the surest way to impending disaster in Yemen.  
What Yemen needs are serious steps that address the very core of its 
problems: a single ethnic group’s control of the decision-making process and 
the corresponding exclusion of other regional, sectarian and tribal groups; the 
absence of a nation-state that represents all segments of its population; an 
institutional deficit; and a need for real democratic reforms that usher in the 
rule of law and are able to hold state officials accountable. Achieving this will 
require three important steps to be taken:  
 
1 The initiative calls for the Yemeni president to delegate his authorities to his vice 
president, and set a 90-day period within which the vice president is to call presidential 
elections. However, it makes sure there will be only one candidate in the presidential 
election, the vice president. It also holds that after the vice president is “elected” as 
president, he is to be responsible for overseeing a transitional period. The opposition is to 
name a candidate for the position of prime minister, and a "national consensus 
government,” divided on a 50/50 basis between the government and the opposition, is to 
be created. The government is to have the authority to “disengage” the armed forces and 
their rival military forces and send them back to their camps. The government and the 
president are to call for a national dialogue conference, tasked with discussing the Yemeni 
conflicts (including the southern question) in a manner that preserves Yemen’s unity. 
 Demonstrating the will to be part of a nation: The Yemeni state, before and 
after unification, has been perilously weak since its inception. For the country 
to start afresh, its various social groups with their diverse sectarian, regional 
and tribal affiliations have to agree to be part of this nation. They have to want 
to be part of this nation. But if this will is to emerge, the state must guarantee 
equal citizenship to its citizens and must stop acting to safeguard a single 
ethnic group’s interests.  
Creating a federal system: I am of the mind that keeping Yemen unified will 
be less costly than allowing it to separate into different units. To give one 
example, the separation of South Yemen would not mark the end but the 
beginning of southerners’ problems. The divisions within South Yemen would 
come to the fore, which would ultimately divide it into at least three parts. 
From this point of view, a federal system that guarantees regional autonomy, 
prevents the hegemony of one region over others and respects citizens’ rights 
offers a way out of this crisis. The one condition necessary for this step is that 
the various Yemeni social groups must demonstrate a will to be part of this 
federal system. If this is absent, then an orderly separation is warranted.  
Creating a state that functions: The international community would be wise to 
step in and help Yemen build its institutional foundation, strengthen its state’s 
capabilities and achieve conditions of law and order. I am mentioning the 
international community here because Yemen is not in a position to do that 
alone.  
I am well aware that all these steps will be very difficult to achieve. Nobody 
said that the task is simple. A difficult and complex situation requires difficult 
decisions and solutions. And even if this task seems overwhelming, as a 
human and a Yemeni I will never lose sight of the fact that it is we, the 
humans, who can make a difference. 
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